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1. Introduction 
One of the central targets of modern performance theory has been the traditional and 
hierarchical distinction between the original work and its performances. First, 
performance is now commonly seen less as a reproduction of a work and more as an 
event, and, moreover, as an event with its own independent revelations, values and 
social meanings.1 Second, there have always been certain kinds of work that seem to 
arise as a result of performance (rather than the other way around) through acts of 
what we call “improvisation”. And third, many developments in modern theory – the 
death of the author, the blurring of textual boundaries, the interest in performative 
meanings, the questioning of the “metaphysics of presence”, the engagement with the 
Body as a central signifier of meaning – have sought to undermine the primacy of the 
“work-concept” (Goehr 1992), and instead attempted to explain the import and 
interest of music as a by-product of the “aura” and “authority” of performers and their 
activities.2  
  One reason why these issues have been difficult to resolve is because they impinge 
upon deep questions about the identity and “mode of existence” of works and 
performances – in other words they raise ontological problems.  Another is that 
responses to these issues have varied according to the philosophical allegiances of the 
theorists, with major divisions of opinion occurring between those who show a 
preference for the methods of the so-called “analytic” school of philosophy (broadly 
Anglo-American in origin), and those who favor the approaches of the “Continental” 
school (broadly German-French in origin). Over the years these two “schools” (in fact 
they are “movements”, rather than “schools”) have glowered at each other’s 
maneuvers with a curious mixture of suspicion and disdain. To the Continentals the 
	   2	  
analytic school seems trapped in the past, still concerned with minute exercises in 
concept analysis and untroubled by the apparent relativism and essentialism of some 
of its operations. The analytic school replies that the “Continentals” have collapsed 
robust relativism into mere subjectivism, and replaced argument and evidence with 
meticulously asserted fantasies in the presence of life and its artworks. These are 
caricatures from both sides, of course, and many theorists are now drawing together 
the most relevant aspects of the two approaches. The danger is that bright ideas will 
be taken out of the philosophical toy box and used as character witnesses in verbal 
dramas rather than as stages in a deepening understanding, and they will become the 
sponsors of counter-suggestion rather than of proof and refutation. Such tendencies 
have enticed us all. The present paper has its basis in the analytic approach, but it is 
hoped that it will take proper note of objections to its perspectives as the arguments 
proceed.  
   In both the analytic and Continental traditions it is not uncommon for discussions of 
ontology to conflate two rather different, though related, issues. The first is the 
question of “individuation”. For example, how are we going to explain how a 
particular work, apparently with a fixed set of characteristics, can retain its individual 
identity through a variety of different performances? This traditional problem has 
never been fully resolved, though the difficulties have been “characterized” by a 
number of different theoretical models and approaches to which we shall come 
shortly. The second issue embedded in the notion of ontology is the question of the 
“mode of existence” of musical works. For example, are they “real” things (materially 
present amongst us), or a kind of developing mental idea (perhaps a 
phenomenological construal born of culture, history, human practice, and 
accumulated experience, etc.)? The phenomenological approach to existence has 
many attractions for those, for example, who wish to free performance from the 
“tyranny” of the pre-existing work, and to dissolve the supposed hierarchy between 
work and performance. Alongside its theoretical concerns with ontology, this paper 
will also investigate exactly which factors in performance lend themselves to 
variation, and whether those elements promise any kind of freedom from the “work 
concept” itself. To do this it will examine a range of different performance situations, 
including: 1) performances that purport to be of a pre-existent notated work in the 
traditional manner; 2) un-notated performances (including some improvisations); and 
3) performances that deny the need for any connection with a work-concept.  
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2. Performance functions and human agency 
Clearly a central problem of variety in relation to the identity of a work arises through 
performance, and so we need to begin by uncovering some of the ways in which the 
performer interfaces with a musical text in traditional, standard cases. Since at least 
1711, when Lord Shaftesbury first used the term “performing arts” (Cooper 1711, vol 
I. sec iii, line 240), we have become accustomed to treating those arts that display 
their works through human intermediaries as a special case. If we are going to 
understand exactly the special functions of the performer in such cases however, the 
first question we have to face is this:  since we perform out the meaning in our heads 
of all the artworks that we come across – whether novels, paintings or beautiful 
buildings – why are not all of the arts performing arts?3   
   The usual first response to this question centers on the fact that for some artworks 
(paintings, for example) the exact sequence of information through time tends not to 
be of primary concern in the normative case, whereas in most performance arts it is. 
We might call this way of discovering the information we receive the seriation 
function of performance. Of course, other types of artworks, such as novels, also 
require a fixed seriation of the information for understanding to take place. But if we 
follow the connected propositions and concepts signaled by the written words, our 
reading will, without much difficulty, place before us what is primarily an “instance” 
of the text (and its meaning) without necessarily providing – in the manner of the 
reading – a dramatized and characterized “performance” of it on a par, say, with those 
given by Dickens when he gave public readings of his novels.4  
   On the other hand, just how we instill meaning into the seriations of an “abstract” 
art such as music is a complex issue. This is because sequences of sound are “non-
propositional”, and cannot themselves makes assertions about the world. It is this 
“non-propositionality” that makes music an abstract art, though we should note that 
this in no way implies that the causes and meanings of music are therefore 
autonomous, or cut off from the world. Even abstract sounds can connect to the world 
through mimicry, association, ritual and social usage, physiological impact, the recall 
of previous works and performances, and in many other ways. Moreover, an 
important first step in connecting such sounds to the world comes through what we 
might call the human-agency function of performance.  
   The fact that performances are usually rendered by human beings makes it easier for 
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us to hear the intensities of the material sounds as somehow appropriate to, or as an 
accompaniment for, human feelings, gestures and responses. In other words the 
human-agency aspect of performance assists us to hear the sounds figuratively or 
symbolically – it provides not only a focus for human identification but, in so doing, it 
encourages a metaphor function. It becomes one of the chief means by which a mere 
set of notational events, a mere sequence of sonic happenings, can be heard as if it is a 
meaningful narrative, or a dialogue, or a developing argument, or an intensification of 
human emotions – in other words such functions contribute to our sense of the 
“aboutness” of abstract music. Indeed, it may be that our identification with the 
human agency element in performance is the very thing that persuades us that music 
itself is “expressive”, and perhaps we should be attributing our “expression 
experiences” in the presence of music to the complex and persuasive interactions and 
identifications between human performers and human listeners. If so, that might save 
us from drawing upon opaque theories of metaphysical embodiment5 in our attempts 
to explain how music “itself” (rather than its particular displays in performance) can 
seem to “be expressive”.  
   Focusing on exactly what the performer chooses to display takes us to the next step 
in this complicated transaction. Any particular human performer will select from the 
many potential ways of displaying the notes, particular ingredients and relationships 
he or she wishes to foreground. In other words they will impose individualized 
patterns of intensity and suggestion upon the music by a process of aspectival 
emphasis, a function which we usually call “interpretation”. 
   What we should notice here is that showing that a set of sounds can be emphasized 
in a particular way, or might be taken as a metaphor, is, at heart, only a neutral piece 
of information. What happens next is that, by their manner of display, certain 
performances win us over to the view that such musical interpretations – perhaps of 
question and answer, coherence or struggle, closure or incompleteness – are 
convincing, or disturbing, or partly obscure, or are worthy of our reactive imagination 
and sympathy. This is what we might call the persuasive function of performance: it 
convinces us, through its apt intensifications, to commit to a certain aspectival way of 
listening, and to appreciate the rewards of its apparent aptness and coherence.  
    Musical performance, of course, takes place in sounds. This means that a 
performance – unlike a written score, or the composer’s idea, or a critic’s description 
of a performance – can be directly sensed as displaying what we might call 
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“musicness”, a soundscape that we perceive as having meanings than cannot be 
completely replaced by any other medium, whether words, analyses, expressive 
splashes of paint, or anything else. This is what we might describe as the musically 
specific, non-substitutable aesthetic function of musical performance. This means that 
we do not just glean information about details of the work from the performance. 
Rather, our knowledge and understanding, gained in that particular way, are infused 
with the special manner of their begetting, and it is through this manner of begetting 
that we move beyond the realm of mere meaningful remarks and into the realm of 
remarkable meanings. And those remarkable meanings are taken to be aesthetic. 
   But the relation of aesthetic qualities to the status of performance needs to be treated 
with some caution. Even if we could clearly establish that performances had aesthetic 
qualities themselves, that would not be enough to show that performance was an 
independent art form in and of itself. After all, a sunset might be aesthetically 
pleasing, but it cannot be well-crafted or ironic or a compelling commentary upon the 
human condition, and we would need to marshal some very tortuous arguments 
indeed to plead that sunsets were artworks in virtue of merely having aesthetic 
qualities.  
   This means that even if we could show that performance on its own had aesthetic 
features, this would still not confirm performance as an artform in its own right. Also, 
for traditional musical performances (as opposed to performance artworks) to 
constitute an independent artform, we would need to show that they operated in a 
genuinely independent way – that there could be brilliant, valuable performances of 
banal works; that we had clear notions of what constituted performing genius (aside 
from being able to understand someone else’s works well); that performance had its 
own art-historical traditions of discovery and innovation, independent of changing 
compositional challenges and styles; and so on. Clearly, the claims of performance to 
some kind of “artness” would need to be made separately from the status of the things 
it performs, and this may not be easy because not all things done with “artistry” entail 
the making of “artworks”. (Zen philosophy, for example, is full of advice about how 
to perform everyday actions with a kind of artistry, without once suggesting that the 
resultant processes and actions lead to construction of artworks).6  
   In traditional cases of western classical music, it is very hard to sever completely 
the causal links between text, performance, and the mediating force of human agency 
which interact in complex ways. Moreover, it will be noticed that in the list of 
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performance functions that arise from that interaction, there has been no 
straightforward acknowledgement that the performance directly displays the work. 
More of that later, but now we need to explain how performance variety is possible 
while retaining some sense of the identity of the text.  
  
3. Theories of Performance Variety: Descriptions v. Explanations 
Just how flexible can performance be in relation to the identity of a musical work? 
Many philosophical theories provide models that accept that the relationship is a 
flexible one (they describe a scheme that accommodates the fact that it happens), but 
very few tell us exactly how the identity of the work is maintained in the case of 
conspicuously varied performance (the detailed explanations tend to be rather “thin”). 
A typical way in which analytic philosophers deal with this issue is to say that we 
should imagine the work as a kind of abstract template, a so-called “type”, and that 
any particular performance or score is therefore a concrete token of that type.7 The 
type-token distinction was first suggested by the philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, 
but its use in aesthetics was established by Richard Wollheim (1968, sec. 35), and it 
now appears in various guises and adaptations. In relation to individual tokens, it does 
not matter if some of the scores are on pink paper and others on white, or if decibel 
levels vary between one performance and another (these are contingent matters), but it 
is generally part of the theory that all tokens are required to share the right number of 
notes in the right order, otherwise – philosophically – they become tokens of a 
different type, a different abstract work. This might be called the “one-wrong-note 
problem”, and it weakens the theory considerably, because it is counterintuitive, and 
because it requires us to postulate a new abstract type every time an adventurous or 
mistake-prone musician takes the stage. In other words, it does not allow us to 
account for variations in performance in relation to the identity of the work – the very 
issue we are interested in.  
     Similar difficulties can arise in phenomenological or hermeneutic approaches. In 
the influential theories of Roman Ingarden, for example, the work is seen as an 
intentional object  (neither fully real, nor fully ideal), which must be “concretized” 
into an aesthetic object by the experiences of those who receive it. Moreover, all such 
works have elements – “spots of indeterminacy” - that are not fully explicated called 
“schematized aspects”. In relation to music, of course, these “schematized” elements 
can be many and varied, and what we want to know is what kinds of concretizations 
	   7	  
(interpretations) count as concretizations of the work, as opposed to merely free 
explorations or reveries in the presence of the “schema”. Ingarden tells us that  “as 
long as the sound base revealed in the performance is in accordance with what the 
score designates, and if, moreover, all the remaining qualities of the work revealed in 
performance do not extend beyond the work as a schema, then every performance 
fulfilling those conditions is ‘proper’ ” (1986, 150). However, in such a theory, even 
if we leave aside the obscurity of how the “qualities of the work revealed in 
performance” could belong to the work but conflict with those suggested by the 
“schema” of the work, what else are we being told about the conditions for compliant 
performances? What exactly is the distinction between the “sound base” of a 
performance and the “sound” of a performance, and precisely how might we go about 
defining those limits set by the “schema” that must not be exceeded? This seems to be 
another typical example of how the fact that there is flexibility is recognized, but no 
clear indication is offered of exactly how the flexibilities are of a type that will not 
break the link between performance variety and the identity of the work.  
 
4. Archival notation, strategic notation, reading cultures and heuristic paths 
To get closer to the types of flexibility involved we need temporarily to shift our 
focus from performance to the musical score. There are various ways in which 
notations might be categorized – for example, there are analogue notations (the 
standard pitches and rhythms on the stave showing “height” and “depth” of sound and 
movement through time), executant notations (tablatures showing in a schematic way 
where to put the fingers on a fret-board), prescriptive notations (standard scores which 
offer a template for a performance), and descriptive notations (notations used by 
ethnomusicologists and others studying oral cultures to record un-notated 
performances that have already taken place). For our purposes, however, we need to 
get at the different functions of notation within any type or system, and for that reason 
it might be helpful to make a distinction between what we might call archival and 
strategic functions. The archival elements would consist of specific rhythms, pitches, 
forms and the like, whereas the strategies would involve invitations to produce certain 
kinds of effect in the most appropriate manner on the occasion of the performance. 
Some of these strategic elements are already quite familiar to us in terms such as 
“cadenza”, or “rubato”, or “espressivo” – after all, we know what effect is required by 
the term “espressivo” but it would be very difficult to define what archived feeling, if 
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any, was supposed to be represented in an “espressivo” moment. To go alongside 
these familiar kinds of strategic terms, there are also, one imagines, strategies implied 
by the score that inform even our use of the archival elements such as particular 
tempo markings, rhythms and dynamics. Such implied strategies might 
include  “please use all the archival elements to create in some way a sense of 
dénouement at bar 200”; or “please create a sense of balance in the texture and formal 
structure – even if your ways of achieving this are not ones envisaged by me, the 
composer”. I mention this last condition because we have evidence from several 
composers, but especially from Brahms,8 that on occasions they were delighted by 
interpretation-solutions that they had never foreseen or were at odds with what they 
had originally intended.  
   Normally, of course, the archival elements in a score are far more in evidence than 
the strategic ones, but there are two further points to make here. One is that in any 
case the strategic elements can certainly on occasions take precedence over the local 
archival details (think how a cadenza might be notated as compared with what any 
particular performer might actually do), and that therefore performance variety is 
sometimes subsumed in the notation usage, and into the reading culture (an important 
element in relation to this debate) implied by its use. The other is that some works – 
particularly avant-garde compositions of one kind or another – are almost entirely 
written in strategic notation rather than archival notation. A famous case in point is 
Cage’s 4’33”, the notation of which provides a strategy for creating a certain kind of 
event or effect (in that sense Cage’s intentions are fully encoded in the work, despite 
his denials), but it can make no attempt to archive the specific details of the ambient 
sound content on any particular performance occasion.9 All of this is to say that the 
identities of works can be defined as much by strategies that leave their exact 
realizations to the performer, as by archives which do not. However, since all 
notations (including strategic ones) imply a reading culture, these identities cannot be 
defined by the notations alone, but must involve some account of the assumed reading 
culture that guides us towards the intended heuristic path. 
   Reading cultures can unsettle our notions of the identity and meanings of works 
because they themselves can have purposes and reasons beyond those of the 
individual work. For example, Glenn Gould in his performance of the fifth variation 
in the first movement of Mozart’s A major piano sonata, K.331, ignores the “Adagio” 
marking and plays it “Allegro” because he wishes to subject the movement to a 
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“Webern-like” scrutiny, by opening the movement with deconstructive slowness and 
gradually accelerating through each section to restore a sense of coherence at the end. 
He felt that the standard performance approach was too well known and needed to be 
de-familiarized (Page 1984, 40-41). This is performance variety arising not from 
something the performer has to “say” about the musical work per se, but from 
something the performer wishes to “say” about our experiences of hearing it 
performed – it is a comment upon the stultifying, over-familiar results of the “reading 
culture” itself. As so often with works of art, the “meaning” arises not just from what 
the artist or performer wants to “say” concerning the work, but what further things 
they wish to say (about traditions, the role of the artist, audience expectations, etc.) by 
saying it under certain cultural conditions. A variant performance such as that by 
Gould should not be seen as impinging on the identity of the work (if anything it is a 
kind of “performing out” of an analysis of the work); rather it acts instead as a 
warning that not all performances are “identity-relevant”, and show us that it may not 
be possible in any simple way to think of a work as somehow arising from the sum of 
its performances. 
   Usually reading cultures act on performance in a more direct way than in the above 
example. In terms of cultural background, there can be few performers who do not 
understand that art forms (whether of jazz, classical music, African drumming, or 
anything else) have conventions and a history. Also that cultural knowledge is usually 
encoded in some kind of “stylistic common practice” when reading and/or performing 
works. This means that the performers need to mediate between the basic denotations 
of the musical symbols (pitches, rhythms, etc.) and their connotations within certain 
cultural, stylistic or expressive settings. This is rarely a purely subjective or “open” 
activity – very few musicians invited to perform a solo in “free” jazz, for example, 
would elect to burst into pastiche Mozart; “authenticity” and “fidelity to style” are 
alive and well in the performance of all kinds of avant-garde music. This is also true 
of the “styles” of listening to music, which draw upon the conventions of a particular 
listening culture. After all, John Cage’s 4’33” was not the first “silent” work to be 
composed, though it was the first to be “received” in the particular way it was in 
1952. For example, in 1897 the French humorist Alphonse Allais published a funeral 
march “for the burial of a deaf man” consisting of 24 blank bars of written “music”.10 
But what was missing in 1897 was the readiness of the audience to “hear” such a 
“silent” work at all, let alone to hear it as giving access to Zen experiences, or as 
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opening the realm of music to ambient sounds, or as a calculated “sneering” at the 
traditional meanings attributed to art (as Jacques Attali famously claimed of Cage’s 
work) (1985, 136). 
    What is interesting about the two “silent” music examples is that, although the 
“reflexive transaction” between work and audience expectations had changed from 
the time of Alphonse Allais to that of Cage, it had not changed completely. In both 
cases the non-appearance of traditional notation retained a sense of “absence”, of 
bewildering non-denotation, which had in some way to be overcome – in Allais’ case 
with a joke, in Cage’s case by questioning the notion of absence. In other words 
traditional meaning was not absent from these works, but rather formed the basis of a 
re-construal, a transformed perspective within a certain continuity of cultural 
meaning.  Both of the contexts worked on a more culturally sustained meaning so as 
to manipulate it for another purpose. We can perhaps see more clearly how this works 
by taking a verbal example. If someone says “that was clever” when a child drops and 
smashes a vase, that does not mean that the word “clever” has suddenly changed its 
meaning to “stupid” (if that were the case then the ironic tone would be completely 
lost); rather it means that the cultural connotation of the sentence uttered in those 
circumstances is equivalent to the sentence “how clever was that?”, which in turn 
invites the thought: “not very”. The “meaning” here can be seen to arise out of a 
“reflexivity” between the intended message and the anticipated listening culture of the 
audience member.11   
   Composers, performers and listeners engage in this kind of reflexive interplay with 
traditional meanings all the time. This does not mean that meanings are eternal or 
essential, but neither does it imply that meanings change constantly or whimsically. 
To understand the “meanings” of performance, and the sustained identity of works 
(and the interactions between them), we need theories of performance to take into 
account the various relatively stable background “texts” of culturally established 
meanings in which they operate. And in this current period of globalization some of 
those meanings seem to be widely understood to a significant degree, as the spread of 
popular musics and films across the globe demonstrates. Almost no society receives 
such artifacts in a totally uncomprehending manner, even if they are sometimes taken 
to be reprehensible colonial pollutions of the indigenous culture. In recent years it has 
been interesting to observe, too, how the implications of Umberto Eco’s famous 
notion of the “open work” (1989) in which the reader or listener or performer is 
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invited to participate in the creation of its meaning (through “unlimited semiosis”) 
have been scaled back by the same author. In a series of publications on “over-
interpretation” and “mis-readings”, the reader/performer is now entreated to 
understand the “evidence” of the work in “sensible” ways, and avoid the “unlimited 
semiosis” that causes us to drift away from what is important in the work (Eco 1990, 
23-43).12 These kinds of difficulties were anticipated in the early years of the 
twentieth century by the founder of semiotics, Ferdinand de Saussure: 
 
The fundamental principle of the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign does not prevent 
us from distinguishing in any language between what is intrinsically arbitrary - that is, 
unmotivated - and what is only relatively arbitrary. Not all signs are absolutely 
arbitrary. In some cases, there are factors which allow us to recognize different degrees 
of arbitrariness, although never to discard the notion entirely. The sign may be 
motivated to a certain extent" (1983, 130). 
 
 Such a “reflexive” model for meaning is not, of course, attempting to tell us how we 
must listen to works or perform them. Instead, it is trying to identify what principles 
make it possible for us, in any relatively stable cultural situation, to listen to works as 
individual, intentional entities, and to appreciate them as music – if that is what we 
want to do. Moreover, it recognizes that within a culture, the reading cultures in 
respect of a work might still contain variations depending on the purpose. For 
example, music analysts or editors might need to read the score of a Rachmaninov 
piano concerto in a very different way from a performer, since some “essential” 
elements of identity for them (individual ways of unfolding structures, the authority of 
the manuscript sources, etc.), may have little direct significance for a performer who 
is interested in the romantic character of its melodies, and the opportunities for 
individualized expressive display.  
   The point here is that all of these elements contribute to the identity of the work 
(because they imply a particular history of production and intention), but the 
hierarchy of identity-markers changes with the circumstance.  It is very important in 
the performance situation to prioritize the display of the romantic character of the 
Rachmaninov, and less important to account for every note (as an analyst might), or 
present a passage as if it were a controversial choice between conflicting surviving 
versions as an editor might (the performer cannot perform a footnote). The task of the 
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performer is to take a set of neutral marks or instructions from the composer (which 
of themselves hold little aesthetic or emotional interest) and assimilate them through 
performance into an already-known wider referential world of “style” and 
“musicness” and “expressive expectation”. Of course, the context-relevant identity-
markers of a Rachmaninov piano concerto performance must have enough notational 
features for it to resemble other instances of the work, but not so many that the 
resemblance always collapses into mere replication, or suppresses other 
characteristics essential to the performance context. Moreover, we negotiate this 
space between resemblance and replication by treating the performance itself as an 
intentional event – by gathering evidence (consciously or unconsciously) that the 
performance is taking the score or “text” as a guiding structural principle in the way 
in which the performance unfolds, even if the “archival content” of the performance 
does not match exactly (for reasons of incompetence, momentary distraction, etc.) the 
archival content of the score.  
 
5.  Un-notated Performances and the Persistence of a “Text” 
It could be argued that although we have explained why a musical text might need 
performance, we have not explained why performance might need a musical 
text.  Indeed it is often assumed that certain kinds of performance, such as 
improvisation, do not need a text. The situation, however, is complicated. In the first 
place some “improvisations” are almost fully prepared or schematized, so that in fact 
there is a kind of virtual notation if not a material one. The following report of an 
interview between Neil Sorrell and the Indian master Ram Narayan offers a clear 
example: 
  
How much does an improvising musician improvise? … At first Ram Narayan 
expressed outright hostility to the view that Indian music is mainly improvised, and 
blamed other Indian musicians for helping to perpetrate this misconception. … His 
argument was that because so much discipline, effort and knowledge are necessary to 
understand the ragas, and – very important – to keep the ragas pure and distinct, then 
logically there cannot be improvisation. For him improvisation suggested unusual 
experiments which flout accepted tradition …(1980, 113) 
 
What this suggests is that the crucial distinction is not between “written” and “oral” 
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cultures, but between prepared and unprepared elements in a performance. Moreover, 
in prepared performances there is always a “text” of sorts, and so we should resist the 
idea that in such un-notated performances “what the work is” emerges simply from 
the sum of its performances. First, in such cases it is difficult to explain how we know 
exactly which performances are relevant to the construction of a particular work 
without already having some shadowy notion of the work against which to check 
them. Second, some performances might contradict others, or the last performance 
might be cancelled - and in the latter case we would need to give some account of 
how we knew that it was indeed the “last” performance, the one needed for final 
completion to take place. Finally, what could those performances possibly be 
“interpretations” of, since the work – we are told - does not exist until they are all 
over? We shall return to these issues later. 
    The presence of a virtual “text” may not be so obvious in all cases where the 
performance is prepared. For example, in discussing his work the jazz saxophonist 
Lee Konitz tells us: “ … my way of preparation [is] not to be prepared. And that takes 
a lot of preparation!”.13 Here Konitz seems to be suggesting that there are different 
kinds of preparation, and ones that eschew any direct models or templates. However, 
these types do not necessarily reject a general “bracketing” of previous performances 
experiences (thus calling them to mind), and neither do they abandon the employment 
of attitudinal strategies presumably directed towards some kind of goal, and some 
notion of success or failure. In such cases, it is a complex issue to discern exactly 
what kind of freedom is being represented by the “non-preparation”. Clearly there is a 
certain kind of freedom from direct (structural? harmonic? melodic?) models, but that 
does not guarantee a freedom to release a completely unfettered flow of previously 
unconceived new material: “escape” freedoms do not automatically lead to 
“fulfillment” freedoms in any kind of creative work (or indeed in politics). 14 
Moreover, from the listener’s point of view, even when there is completely new 
material the gestural surface of the performance display makes us feel as though the 
performance must be about something, and it is difficult not to take that “something” 
to be a “text” of some kind, even if the “text” is little more than the skill-set of a 
particular performer heard through a concatenation of the playing techniques 
displayed in the performance. What this amounts to is that the human-agency element 
of performance encourages us to construct persuasive metaphors of coherence, and 
the listening culture frequently guides us to hear non-texted performances such as 
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improvisations as if they are revelations of a text, even if that “text” is unfolding for 
the first time before the ears of the performer as well as the listener.  
  However, there is an important difference between the Indian raga example and the 
jazz example above. In the latter case, the “text” (the revealed and remembered event) 
comes after the performance in the causal hierarchy, where as in the Indian example 
(employing a kind of virtual score) it is prior to it. The notion that some “texts” might 
arise from performances rather than instigate them will be explored in the final 
section of this paper.  
 
6. Works of Music v. Works for Music 
We now need to suggest some specific ways in which we might theorize the links 
between performance variety and the fixed identity of the score. Part of the problem 
seems to be that when we refer to what we call a musical work, we are really referring 
to something that has two rather separate components – there is what we might call 
the identity element (the things that distinguish this creative design from other 
creative designs), and there is the “musicness” element (that is those aspects that 
result from the performer transforming the created instructions into audible music). 
Note that even a visitor from Mars could probably spot the distinct identity of a 
notational scheme without even knowing what music was. True, the Martian might 
mistake the marked page for a unique kind of wallpaper, but he or she (or it) would 
not need to know that the marks represented sounds. Of course we, not being 
Martians, know that notations and scores and the ideas of composers however 
signaled - even though they usually have distinct identities - are not yet music, they 
only have the potential to give rise to music and need to be realized through 
performance. For that reason we should perhaps not call scores “music” (the German 
language, unlike English, clearly preserves the distinction between “Noten” and 
“Musik”), but rather, for the sake of clarity, refer to them as “performables”.15 What 
then happens is that the performer brings to bear his or her cultural understanding in 
relation to the use of the “performable” (score), and out of that transaction the work is 
revealed to have musical import as well as an identity.  
   This separation does lead to the conclusion that there are no musical works as such, 
there are only musical performances – a formulation that splits the criteria for identity 
from the criteria for musicness. The so-called “works” (actually “performables”) are 
not of music, they are for music. And this means that neither the score alone nor the 
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performance alone encodes what we think of as the “musical work” completely. 
Instead the notion of the “musical” work is something that arises in virtue of a 
combinatorial act – an act that outlines in its structural features an identity in keeping 
with the notated or intended scheme, while creating in the goal-driven intensities of 
its sonic surface an instantiation of  “musicness”. Moreover, one further thing to note 
is that “musicness”, as an entity, also has an identity in its own right. Thus this 
suggests that we might require a kind of double ontology to fix the identity of what 
we call in a general way a “musical work” – the ontology of the individual 
performable, and the ontology of the generic type “musicness”.16 
    Taking these elements together we can begin to a construct a taxonomy of the link 
between the varied displays of “musicness” and the fixed identity of “performables” 
in our scheme. First, in the case of the performables, the notation already combines 
definite archival information (pitches, forms, and so on) with various types of 
strategic instruction (cadenza, “open the piano lid for 4’33” “, etc.).  These features 
inherently leave open various pathways for their fulfillment, and signal within the 
performable itself the anticipation of varied performance display. Second, as we have 
seen, the priorities between the various identity-markers of the performable (the right 
notes in the right order, the authority of the manuscript source, the various types of 
composer intention, etc.) can change with the context – whether engaged in editing, 
analysis, performance, or some other task. Third, what also needs to be in evidence is 
at least an intention for the performance to be governed in principle by the archival 
and strategic elements encoded in the performable. Fourth, through the act of 
performance a further set of attributes (sonic aesthetic qualities) will be contributed in 
the service of “musicness” – that is, in the service of the general type of artefactuality 
(“music”) that the schematic “work” (performable) will possess. And, as we know, 
performances can employ a varied range of techniques to evoke the generic type 
“music”, since in that facet of their activity they only have to be faithful to the general 
type of artefactuality, not the particular schematic “work”.  
 
7. Afterword: The challenges of performances without a text-concept or work-concept 
At some level, it is not difficult to describe the kinds of attribute a performance event 
would have to have, were it to wish to operate without a text-concept at all, and to 
reject the notion of its being a “work”. The performance would provide the content of 
the event, it would not be the mere medium through which a “text” was instantiated. 
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The traditional “illustrative” presentation of a work would be replaced by sonic and 
somatic presentations, where the body and certain accompanying events (perhaps 
sonic events) became the focus of attention. Moreover, the performance might take on 
a project-like character, directed towards a particular kind of achievement or 
response.  
    So far, however, we have described performance in terms that could be applied to 
perfectly ordinary events in life – hand-washing for example, or walking down the 
street. Something more is required for these actions to become artworks, and if there 
is a desire for them to be considered in that way then the “artist” must already know 
what art is, and believe in its kudos, otherwise why would there be an attempt to 
include it in that realm? Such ideas in relation to art originate, not in some subjective, 
solipsistic feeling, but within the wider “text” of culture and tradition, and this public 
aspect is difficult to eradicate from art. Even performance art gains credence from the 
context in which it is displayed; it draws its audience into a kind of community theatre 
and is almost always public in some sense. Moreover, if we wish to call something an 
“artwork” then we are implying that there is a difference between an artwork and a 
mere real thing, and for that to be true then that difference needs to be realizable in 
some way – most frequently through a difference of experience. Moreover, the goal to 
transform experience though artistic activity already carries within it the possibility of 
a certain kind of success or failure.  
    Normally in “free” performances the notions of “artistic” success or failure still 
tend to lean, not so much on the idea of “inherent” values contained within the artistic 
object or product, but on a belief in the sanctioning attributes of creativity and 
imagination as displayed through the event or its instigating ideas.  Such an approach, 
of course, still draws strongly on traditional ideas embedded in the culture – ideas of 
the importance of the distinction between trivial, banal novelty and wider innovation; 
and between a routine re-mixing of ideas already linked by convention and habit, and 
insightful re-conceptualizing. After all, not all “creations” are creatively discovered, 
and not all “imaginings” are imaginatively done, and some have argued that the 
implied standards here are more difficult to achieve in “spontaneous composition”. 
For these and other reasons the criteria for value in free performances have shifted 
away from the compositional “work” model, and moved towards the special attributes 
of “spontaneity” in performance, and the “inherent” values of the “texture” of the 
event.  
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   This is not the place to conduct a deep analysis of these issues, but in the case of 
spontaneity we should at least recognize that in the performance arts “spontaneity” 
sometimes refers to a style of display rather than acting as a causal explanation of the 
origins of the material. It is for this reason, for example, that the nineteenth century 
saw a rise in genres of composed classical music that invited this kind of display from 
the performer – impromptus, rhapsodies, fantasias – and presumably why a jazz 
musician like George Gershwin felt there was no contradiction in meticulously 
composing his “Rhapsody”in Blue. There is, of course, a strong alternative claim that 
the success or failure of the free performance is not “about” styles of performance or 
its status as a “work”; it is “about” the “texture” of that experience on its own. 
However, it is still an experience which contains within itself a trace of the particular 
(artistic) manner of its begetting and unfolding – a particular event with a 
particularized content which we capture imaginatively as a kind of “text” to which we 
can refer back in some detail in order to develop and conclude our aesthetic and 
conceptual ruminations, even if for technical and other reasons we cannot reproduce 
the “text” exactly. Artistic performances that are not “about” something, and are not 
the performing out “of” something (even if only a concept), are difficult to include in 
the realm of art at all, whether traditional or contemporary.  
   Of course, “free” performances are usually characterized as being “in the moment” 
and semi-detached from the work concept. Moreover, they are now more usually 
assessed not in terms of criteria taken from analytic philosophy, but via notions taken 
from Continental traditions of phenomenology. One such approach, for example, can 
be found in Bruce Ellis Benson’s book The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue which 
conducts a hermeneutic analysis, partly derived from the methods of Husserl, of the 
“referential insights” (historical, social, and so on) contained within the experiences 
we have in the presence of performance. However, as we build up the hermeneutic 
picture of our insights it is difficult not to see in this picture a shadowy “text” to 
which we refer to make sense of our experiences, even if the significance of that 
picture changes in the wake of the ongoing cultural “game” between all of those 
involved in the arena of music (Benson 2003, 191). By contrast, Gary Peters, in his 
The Philosophy of Improvisation, tends towards an ontological type of 
phenomenology derived from Heidegger. He treats such performances as stages in the 
“infinite Becoming” of the concept of improvisation, the stages of which are 
themselves an improvisation of continuing understanding. As for the performance, the 
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implication is that it is not so much a question of “being present at the live event”, but 
rather of developing an ongoing “awareness of the performative thinking” displayed 
in that event, despite its apparent fixity in time and place (Peters 2009, 146 and 152). 
In this enterprise, the emphasis is less on the realm of objective meaning and more on  
the realm of ongoing immediate experience. Of course, in such an enterprise it does 
not mean that there is no “text”, but rather that the text has an afterlife, and that it is 
taken on a journey towards the “unconcealment” of its meaning for us.  Such “texts” 
stand at the beginning, rather than the end, of that journey towards identity and 
“truth”, but they suggest an instigating identity none-the-less, and in so doing provide 
a focus for success or failure, and the “meaningfulness” of our experiences in the 
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1 See, for example, (Frith 1996), especially Chapter 10.  On the opposition between 
‘works’ and ‘events’ see: (Dahlhaus 1983, 132ff). The ontology of ‘events’ is at least 
as complex as that of ‘works’: see (Lombard 1995, 140-144). 2	  A classic account of the ‘aura’ of performers occurs in: (Benjamin 1973, 211-244). 
3 See for example in (Nancy 1996), Chapter 1: ‘Why are there several arts and not just 
one?’. 
4 For a sustained attempt to make clear distinctions between instantiation and 
performance see: (Kivy 2006). 
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  5	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following recent guides to aesthetics even attempts an article on “embodiment”: 
(Kelly 1998); (Levinson 2003); (Kivy 2004); (Gaut and McIver Lopes 2005); and 
(Stephen Davies et al. 2009). Nor does the term ‘embodiment’ occur in the indexes to 
those books, or in standard guides to metaphysics such as (Kim and Sosa 1995). 	  
6 For some important distinctions between the aesthetics of actions, making art with 
artistry, and the art-ness of artworks, see: (Brinker 1987). 
7 For recent surveys of ontological theories of music see, for example: (Davies 2001), 
which engages in greatest detail with the work of Goodman, Levinson and 
Wolterstorff, and supports a contextualist theory of ontology; (Dodd 2007), which 
rigorously develops a Platonist conclusion; and (Gracyck and Kania 2011), Chapters 
4 and 53, which attempt a responsible outline of the major theories (analytic, 
phenomenological and otherwise).  8	  See: (Musgrave and Sherman 2003, 5, 21, 23, 24, 31 and 32); and (Day 2000, 187-
8). 9	  On the various notated versions of the score of 4’33” see (Fetterman 1996, 69-84). 
10  Printed in: (Allais 1897). The “work” was first presented at the Salon des 
Incohérents in 1884, along with an entirely white painting (“Anaemic Girls [dressed 
in white] on their way to their First Communion through the Snow”), which 
anticipates in appearance the infamous white canvas paintings of Robert 
Rauschenberg produced 67 years later.  Allais’ work is available at: 
http://alphonseallais.blogspot.co.uk/2010/06/blog-post_11.html . 
11  For a classic philosophical discussion of the “reflexivity” of meaning as arising 
between intended “messages” and anticipated responses, see: (Grice 1989). 12	  See	  also:	  (Eco	  1992).	  
13  Quoted in: (Hamilton 2007, 207).	  14	  See: (Berlin 2002, 166-217).	  
15 I have borrowed this term from the philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff, but apply it 
in a rather different way. See: (Wolterstorff 1992, 310-14: at 310). 16	  	  The detailed philosophical arguments for this must wait for a more technical paper 
(forthcoming).	  However,	  for a classic account of one sort of “double ontology” see: 
(Aristotle 1933, Book VII (= Book Zeta), sec. 4-6), where he discusses the notion of 
“man” in conjunction with “musical man” (section 4). See also the commentary in: 
(Bostock 1994, 116-18). To be brief, following the work of W. V. Quine in the 1950s 
it was thought impossible to prove that that there were “real essences” or that 
properties true of an object were essential to that object; more recent work has 
complicated the issue.  
 
 
